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PATIENT DUMPING AND
EMTALA: PAST
IMPERFECT/FUTURE SHOCK
David A. Hymant
1. INTRODUCTION
THIS SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF HEALTH MATRIX
marks the tenth anniversary of the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).' Some groups mark
similar anniversaries with marches, rallies, and demonstrations.
Law school professors are less physical; we celebrate our anni-
versaries by holding symposia at which we consider legal
means and ends. Ideally, such efforts will result in an assess-
ment of whether "reform" has actually improved matters -
which it often does not.
EMTALA is an unlikely candidate for such scrutiny. The
statute is wildly popular across the entirety of the political
spectrum, and among such disparate interest groups as physi-
cians, advocates for the poor, professors of law and public
health, and consumer groups. Unlike many reforms, EMTALA
does not create a new administrative bureaucracy; it does not
favor the interests of the well-connected against the less fortu-
nate; its on-budget costs are modest; and it seems to be no
more intrusive than is absolutely necessary to accomplish its
objectives. The goal EMTALA was intended to accomplish -
t Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1983, J.D. 1989,
M.D. 1991, University of Chicago.
1. The Symposium was held on April 19, 1997 at Case Western Reserve University Law
School. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), of which
EMTALA is a single section, was signed by President Reagan on April 7, 1986. See Andrew Jay
McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 173, 197-98 n.106 (1989) (chronicling the tortuous adoption of COBRA).
EMTALA's provisions took effect on August 1, 1986. Id. at 198. Only lawyers, whose inadequa-
cies in mathematics are well-documented, could conclude that the symposium marked
EMTALA's tenth anniversary.
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access to emergency care for those unable to pay - is similar-
ly hard to take issue with. Not surprisingly, the conventional
wisdom on EMTALA is overwhelmingly favorable.2
Despite this glowing picture, EMTALA's flaws far exceed
its limited virtues. The statute is sloppily drafted, and the most
important words are undefined or defined far too broadly. The
premise of the statute is silly at best; one cannot impose open-
ended obligations of this sort on private parties and expect
them to meekly comply - and the inevitable adaptive respons-
es make everyone worse off. The private right of action effec-
tively creates a federalized medical malpractice regime with the
distinct tendency to reward the wrong people. When the federal
government enforces EMTALA, its aim and tactics leave much
to be desired.
Some of these topics have been addressed by other au-
thors, and I cover them at length in two other articles.3 In-
stead, this Article analyzes the original (anecdotal) case for
EMTALA, and predicts the statute's future prospects in light of
the changes in the health care marketplace. These may seem
peculiar subjects for scrutiny at a Symposium marking the
tenth anniversary of EMTALA. Academic symposia tend to be
dominated by debate over intended and unintended statutory
consequences, with future prospects a distant second - and
statutory causes a non-starter.
2. To be sure, there has been quibbling about various peripheral issues - usually
expressed in terms of "EMTALA could be improved by [fill in the blank]." See Lawrence E.
Singer, Look What They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's Implosion, 33 Hous L. REv. 113
(1996) (changing the definition of "appropriate" to eliminate overlap with malpractice law);
William N. Wiechmann, Language Barrier to Emergency Health Care: Definitional Imprecision
Still Plagues the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 9 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 161
(1992) (improving definitions of terms in statute); Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Son of COBRA:
The Evolution ofa Federal Malpractice Law, 45 STAN. L. REv. 263 (1992) (assessing the overlap
with malpractice law). But see Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency
Health Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 971 (arguing that
regulatory responses like EMTALA will not work, and Congress should focus on making
insurance more affordable by, inter alia, eliminating community rating); Mark A. Hall, The
Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 JuRIMETRIcS J. 389 (1988) (arguing that
EMTALA is worse than no legislation).
3. See David A. Hyman, Dumping EMTALA: When Bud Laws Happen to Good People
(Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Bud Laws] (cataloguing problems with EMTALA) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); David A. Hyman, Should We Depend on the Kindness of
Strangers?: Ethics, Economics, and Emergency Care (Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Kindness of
Strangers] (arguing that public health is better served by focusing free and subsidized services in
areas other than emergency care) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Although statutory effects bear investigating, EMTALA's
origins are worth considering, if only with the (faint) hope that
Congress might not repeat the same mistakes the next time
around.4 Similarly, EMTALA's prospects are worth consider-
ing, if only to avoid future shock.' Accordingly, Part II pro-
vides a brief overview of EMTALA's provisions. Part III ana-
lyzes the anecdotal basis for EMTALA. Part IV assesses the
empirical case for EMTALA. Part V discusses the prospects
for EMTALA in light of the changes in the health care market-
place. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
H. EMTALA
Although EMTALA has a series of interlocking provi-
sions, its basic structure is fairly straightforward. Any individu-
al who presents at a "qualifying hospital" and requests care is
entitled to an "appropriate" medical screening examination to
determine whether an "emergency medical condition" is pres-
ent.6 If so, the patient cannot be "transferred" until the "emer-
gency medical condition" is "stabilized."7 If the patient can
4. My hope is faint, because Congress routinely legislates on the basis of anecdote - and
continues to use budget reconciliation acts to accomplish that objective. See Bradley J. Meier, The
New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIs. 265, 274-78
(1997) (noting use of Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act to enact anecdote-driven leg-
islation prohibiting patenting of medical procedures).
5. See ALIviN ToFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 4 (1970) ("In 1965, in an article in Horizon, I
coined the term 'future shock' to describe the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in
individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time").
6. A "qualifying" hospital is a hospital that has a Medicare contract; this criterion includes
almost all hospitals in the United States EMTALA does not define "appropriate," and the
regulations disclaim the possibility of doing so. 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489 (1997). EMTALA
specifically defines "emergency medical condition" as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention
could reasonably be expected to result in (i) placing the health of the individual (or,
with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in
serious jeopardy, (n) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (m) serious dys-
function of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions (i) that there
is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before delivery, or (n1)
that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the unborn child.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(1) (West 1997).
7. A "transfer" is the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside a
hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or associated, directly
or indirectly, with) the hospital, but does not include such a movement of an individual who (A)
has been declared dead, or (B) leaves the facility without the permission of any such person. 42
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not be "stabilized," definitive treatment must be provided, or
an "appropriate transfer" may be performed.8
Physicians who are "on-call" to the emergency room are
required to come to the hospital and provide all necessary
services. Hospitals must also accept transfers if they have the
capacity and capability to do so. Compliance is ensured by
various enforcement provisions, including civil monetary penal-
ties, civil suits, and exclusion from Medicare. Various house-
keeping measures help to ensure compliance.9
1I. THE ANECDOTAL CASE FOR EMTALA
The case for EMTALA was built on a foundation of heart-
rending anecdotes in which hospital emergency departments
(EDs) callously denied life-saving care to those in need.' °
U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(4) (West 1997).
"Stabilized" means that "no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within
reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility .... "42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B) (West 1997). If the individual is a pregnant woman
having contractions, "stabilized" effectively means thatthe woman has delivered both the child
and the placenta, unless the hospital is prepared to accept a substantial EMTALA liability risk.
See Burditt v. United States, 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991). The court stated:
We think that [EMTALA] allows hospitals to transfer at will women in uncomplicated
labor who, within reasonable medical probability, will arrive at another hospital before
they deliver their babies. A hospital that transfers a woman in labor when the timing
call mandated by [EMTALA] is close risks a battle of experts regarding anticipated
delivery time, distance, and safe transport speed.
We believe that Congress intended.. . to extend EMTALA's "treat or transfer" pro-
tection to women in labor who have any complication with their pregnancies
regardless of delivery imminence.
Id. at 1369-70.
8. Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c)(l) (West 1997) (general prohibition on transfer unless
stabilized), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A), (c)(2) (West 1997) (pre-stabilization transfer
allowed if "appropriate" (i.e. transferring facility provides treatment it is able to; receiving facility
has available space and personnel and has agreed to accept transfer, applicable medical records
sent with patient; transfer effected with acceptable means) and the patient consents in writing after
being informed of hospital's obligations under EMTALA and the risks of transfer or a physician
or qualified medical person certifies in writing that benefits of transfer outweighs the risks).
9. These measures include preemption of conflicting state and federal laws; a requirement
that hospitals maintain a log of all patients seen in the emergency room and report all violations of
EMTALA to the federal government within 72 hours of their occurrence; post signs in the
emergency department (ED) providing notice to all persons of the hospital's obligations under
EMTALA; not delay care to inquire about the insurance status of a patient; and a prohibition on
retaliation against "whistle-blowers" and physicians who refuse to approve the transfer of an
unstable patient. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(f), (i) (West 1997).
10. See 131 CONG. REc. S13892-01, 1985 ("Frankly, we do not know how pervasive this
[Vol. 8:29
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Post-enactment monitoring of EMTALA also emphasized
anecdotal evidence; at the only Congressional hearing on pa-
tient dumping, the first panel featured three witnesses who
provided personal anecdotes about their experiences with
dumping." These trends are reflected in academic assessments
of patient dumping; law review articles on the subject almost
invariably include horrifying anecdotes about someone who
suffered death, permanent disability, or the loss of a child as a
result of the denial of necessary emergency care."
Anecdotal evidence can help to put a human face on a
particular problem. 3 However, such evidence provides no
basis for legislation until the truthfulness, typicality, and fre-
quency of the anecdote is established - and disregarding these
precepts is exceedingly unwise. 4 Despite these difficulties,
practice of dumping the sick and the indigent from emergency rooms actually is. The evidence I
have seen so far is primarily anecdotal.") (statement of Sen. Durenberger). The Congressional
Committee reports reflect a similar assessment. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, P.3 at 728 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726,728 ("There was little evidence available to the Committee
during its consideration of H.R. 3128 as to the scope of the problem addressed by § 124, since
there have been no hearings in either the House or the Senate on this issue or on the language
recommended by the Ways and Means Committee."). See also 132 CoNG. REC. E24-02 (1986)
(remarking that an article in the Oakland Tribune is "one of the reasons that we have been able to
include in the reconciliation bill... antidumping language designed to stop hospitals from
dumping poor patients on other public and charity hospitals.") (statement of Rep. Stark).
11. The first panel featured two witnesses to alleged dumping incidents and a
representative of an advocacy group who recounted anecdotes about various alleged episodes of
dumping from around the nation. The second panel was composed of three long-time physician
opponents of economically motivated patient transfers, two of whom had authored empirical
studies of the issue (Drs. Ansell and Kellerman). The third panel was composed of representatives
of the administration who were chided for their failure to enforce EMTALA.
12. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide
Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21, 21-22 (1989) (recounting anecdotes); McClurg, supra
note 1, at 174-75 n.3 (recounting anecdotes).
13. Cf. Sidney Dean Watson, In Search ofthe Story: Physicians and Charity Care, 15 ST.
Louis UNiv. PUB. L. REv. 353 (1996). He states:
The bioethical method, with its dependence on real cases and real stories, breathes life
into the overwhelming, yet dry statistics about the face of poverty in this country.
Generalities and statistics are necessary because they provide the big picture, but they
mask the meanings, implications, and complexities for particular people and particular
locations. Bioethics' stories show the experiences of real people.
Id. at 367-68.
14. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147,1161 (1992):
The trouble with legislation by anecdote is not just that some of them are false or
misleading. Even if true and accurate, anecdotes contribute little to developing a
meaningful picture of the situation about which we are concerned. It makes a
difference if for every ten anecdotes in which an undeserving plaintiff bankrupts an
innocent defendant, one, ten, one hundred, or one thousand equal and opposite
19981
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anecdote-driven legislation is frequently embraced as the un-
derlying subject matter becomes more complex and the trade-
offs become tougher. Unfortunately, the higher the stakes, the
greater the adverse consequences if the anecdote which is
generalized is inaccurate or atypical.
EMTALA provides an object lesson on these points. Con-
sider the legend of Mr. Terry Takewell. Mr. Takewell's legend
has been infamous in health policy circles ever since his neigh-
bor, Ms. Zettie Mae Hill, was the lead-off witness at the only
Congressional hearing ever held on EMTALA. 5  Mr.
Takewell's story was prominently featured in the committee
report which resulted from the hearing 6 and became the prin-
cipal example of patient dumping in academic commentaries
on EMTALA. 7
The standard version of the legend of Mr. Takewell is
horrifying. Uninsured, unemployed, and afflicted with poorly
controlled diabetes since his youth, he had run up a large bill
at the local hospital. After his doctor ordered him admitted, he
was taken to Methodist Hospital in Somerville, Tennessee by
ambulance, gasping for breath, in a diabetic coma, and in dire
need of emergency medical attention. He was met in his room
injustices are done to innocent plaintiffs. The proportion of cases that results in one or
the other error, and the ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater
interest to serious policy-makers than a handful of anecdotes on either side of the
issue. Reforms are intended to change that ratio and the tens of thousands of anecdotes
the ratio summarizes.
15. Ms. Hill was presumably chosen for this honor because the story she related
exemplified the points Representative Weiss, who was holding the hearing, wanted to make.
Representative Weiss "considered the Administration to be lax in its enforcement" of EMTALA,
and he believed that "hospitals and physicians needed to have the 'perception' that the law is
being vigorously enforced and penalties applied." Michelle L. Robinson, Patient 'Dumping'
Regulations Offer Little Guidance, 61 HosP., Sept. 5, 1987, at 35, 36 (quoting Rep. Ted Weiss (D-
NY)). The tenor of the hearing was captured by Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark, one of the key figures
in EMTALA's enactment, who urged Representative Weiss to "hammer on the table so that
hospitals know we mean business" Id.
16. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EQUAL AccEss TO HEALTH CAR. PATwNT
DUMPING, H.R. Rep. No. 100-531, at 11 (1988) (hereinafter EQUAL ACCEss).
17. See Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room,
46 STAN. L. REv. 449,450-51 (1994) (using Takewell as an example); Sylvia A. Law, A Right to
Health Care That Cannot be Taken Away: The Lessons of Twenty-Five Years of Health Care
Advocacy, 61 TENN. L. REv. 771,779 (1994) (citing the committee account of Takewell as "[o]ne
of the most dramatic cases presented"); David M. Frankford, Privatizing Health Care: Economic
Magic to Cure Legal Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 90 (1992) (describing Takewell's story as
an "easy case'D; Wiechmann, supra note 2, at 161-62; Rothenberg, supra note 12, at 21; McClurg,
supra note 1, at 205 n.173 (using Takewell as an example).
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by the hospital administrator, who picked him up out of his
hospital bed and carried him out of the building and across the
parking lot. Mr. Takewell was left under a tree - shirtless,
barefoot, and helpless. His friends found him and took him
home, where he died the next day. Following an investigation
by a state board dominated by health care providers, Methodist
Hospital was cleared of any responsibility for the incident."8
Although the legend of Mr. Takewell may appear compel-
ling, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical. Ms. Hill
did not personally witness most of the events in question.19
Her testimony at the hearing was not subjected to even friendly
cross examination, nor was her testimony supplemented by that
of any of the other witnesses to the events in question - of
which there were many. Thus, the "official" version of Mr.
Takewell's story is based on a highly selective presentation of
hearsay evidence.2'
Despite these warning signs, the legend of Mr. Takewell
has become the paradigmatic case for the evils of patient
dumping." Indeed, those who hear the legend take from it the
understandable lesson that something must be done about pa-
tient dumping. After all, what kind of country is this where
EDs can simply refuse to provide care to those in need? Bot-
tom-line oriented administrators have no business making such
decisions. Consistent with the Hippocratic oath, doctors and
hospitals should take care of those in need - and anyone who
interferes with that sacred mission should be incarcerated.'
18. This narrative is drawn from EQUAL AccESs, supra note 16, at 11.
19. Ms. Hill personally witnessed Mr. Takewell's condition before he was taken to the
doctor and, from a distance, while he was being examined by Dr. Bishop. She next saw Mr.
Takewell under a tree in the hospital parking lot. Thus, she was not present during Mr. Takewell's
encounter with Methodist Hospital. See PATIENT DUMPING: HEARING BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF
THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 100th Cong. 17, 18
(1987) (statement of Zettie Mae Hill).
20. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EViD.
801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless it falls within an exception to the rule or an exclusion from
the definition. FED. R. Evm. 802-04. Hearsay is generally excluded because of the "risks that
come with relying on the word or say-so of another person," including misperception, failing of
memory, shading of the truth, and misunderstanding of the declarant. CHRIMSTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KnPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.2 (1995).
21. See sources cited supra note 17.
22. As originally proposed, EMTALA provided for exactly that. The criminal provisions
were deleted after the Senate Judiciary Committee observed that they might be counterproductive.
1998]
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Some additional facts should be added in the interest of
evaluating the legend of Mr. Takewell on the basis of a full re-
cord.' Mr. Takewell's diabetes was poorly controlled because
he did not always take his insulin with the required regular-
ity.24 A psychologist testified that Mr. Takewell had a lengthy
history of not taking his insulin so that he could be "rescued"
by medical personnel.' When Mr. Takewell died, there was
no insulin in his house - and the Medical Examiner noted on
the death certificate that Mr. Takewell would use his money to
purchase alcohol and drugs, including cocaine, instead of insu-
lin.
During the two years prior to his death, Mr. Takewell had
been treated at Methodist Hospital twelve times, including
seven hospital admissions, for which he owed Methodist Hos-
pital approximately $9,500. Although Mr. Takewell would
almost certainly have qualified for free care, he had repeatedly
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt.3 at 6 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727 ("The
Committee is concerned that if penalties are too severe, some hospitals, particularly those located
in rural or poor areas, may decide to close their emergency room entirely rather than risk the civil
fines, damage awards, and, as to physicians, criminal penalties that might ensue.").
23. The more complete version of Mr. Takewell's story contained in this Article is based
on the case file of the Tennessee Board For Licensing Health Care Facilities (the "Board"). See
Methodist Hospital of Somerville, Inc., Before the Tenn. Board for Licensing Health Care
Facilities, Agency Case No. 86-0600 (excerpt from the transcript of proceedings, April 28-30,
1987) [hereinafter Transcripts]. The Board held two days of contentious hearings, at which
testimony was taken under oath, and subjected to cross-examination. In the interest of style, a
statement in the case file was treated as factual if two witnesses testified to it, and cross-
examination did not shake the testimony, or if the statement was included in an official police
report or autopsy record. If only one witness testified to a statement, it is attributed solely to that
witness. All references are to specific pages in the hearing transcript. See id.
A more extensive analysis of the legend of Mr. Takewell and of several other patient
dumping anecdotes is contained in David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND.
L. J. (forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Lies, Damned Lies].
24. See Transcripts, supra note 23 at 145. "[A] lot of times he didn't follow his treatment
right, and he'd get sick, you know, and get unable to work." Id. at 247. Other testimony reflected
that Mr. Takewell was taking his insulin and eating properly "on and off for a couple of weeks."
Id. at 367. However, a third witness testified that Mr. Takewell was taking his insulin and
following his diet while living in Middle Coff Trailer Park. See id. at 32.
25. "Most of the literature indicates that the noncompliant diabetic - one of the motives,
one of the perhaps unconscious motives is to quote create chaos or create a set of crises in which
the authority figures in their lives are kind of kept off balance, kind of kept out of balance. The
psychological and psychiatric literature interprets this as an effort to manipulate and to contrive
crises such that the patient then has to be rescued... Id. at 148-49. The psychologist also
testified that Mr. Takewell had a history of coping with authority figures by "denial, avoidance,
and more particularly by the mechanism of flight... if an authority figure frustrated him, rather
than seeking to work out the problem or think through the problem, he would simply leave." Id. at
154. The psychologist had treated Mr. Takewell in 1979 and 1981, but had not seen him during
the intervening years. See id. at 131.
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refused to provide proof of income, which would have allowed
Methodist Hospital to zero-out his bill. Methodist Hospital per-
sonnel had informed Mr. Takewell that they would provide
care to him if he were in an emergency situation, but they
needed him to provide proof of income for non-emergency
care.
On September 16, 1986, an ambulance was summoned to
pick up Mr. Takewell from his home because his neighbors
believed he was sick. The emergency medical technician
(EMT) who evaluated him at the scene did not believe he was
ill.' The ambulance took him to the Morris Clinic, where he
was evaluated by Dr. John Bishop.' After observing that Mr.
Takewell was hyperventilating slightly, was somewhat lethar-
gic, and had a modestly elevated blood glucose of 250, Dr.
Bishop decided that he should be admitted to the hospital for
testing.
When Mr. Takewell arrived at Methodist Hospital, he was
taken directly to a patient room. The acting hospital adminis-
trator phoned Dr. Bishop to inform him the hospital would
admit Mr. Takewell if it was an emergency, but they needed
him to complete the forms for free care if it was not. Dr. Bish-
op told the administrator that Mr. Takewell "would probably
be all right" if he was not admitted.'
The acting hospital administrator went to Mr. Takewell's
room and told him that he would be admitted only if he coop-
erated with Methodist Hospital's attempts to qualify him for
free care, or if it was a true emergency. Mr. Takewell got up
from his bed, walked into and used the bathroom, and then
walked out of Methodist Hospital. The acting administrator
walked with him, attempting to persuade him to stay and exe-
cute the forms.
26. The EMT testified that Mr. Takewell was not sweaty, did not have the fruity breath
characteristic of diabetic ketoacidosis, was alert and oriented, with reactive pupils, and warm and
dry skin. See id. at 342-46. The EMT testified that he did not believe that Mr. Takewell's
condition constituted an emergency, and stated that "[There was no medical finding." Id. at 346,
357.
27. See id. at 17-18, 42. Dr. Bishop was board-certified in family practice and emergency
medicine. See id. at 40. Mr. Takewell had previously received outpatient treatment at the Morris
Clinic where Dr. Bishop was a partner. However, Dr. Bishop was not Mr. Takewell's doctor, and
did not recall treating him previously. See id. at 42.
28. Id. at 80, 81, 87.
1998]
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After he left Methodist Hospital, Mr. Takewell walked
next door and waited under a tree in front of the local phar-
macy. When Ms. Hill and one of her neighbors drove past Mr.
Takewell on their way to the hospital, she testified that he
recognized them at "some distance" and he made a "racket" or
"holler[ed] out."'29 Although Ms. Hill testified that she spoke
with Mr. Takewell about the reason he was "discharged," and
also called Methodist Hospital to inquire about the same sub-
ject, the substance of her conversations was excluded as inad-
missible. Mr. Takewell was found dead the next day. Shortly
after Mr. Takewell's death, Methodist Hospital and Dr. Bishop
issued the following joint media statement:
On Tuesday, September 16th Terry Takewell was brought
to Morris Clinic of Somerville, Tennessee by ambulance, as a
means of routine transfer and in a non-emergency mode from
his home in Somerville. Dr. John Bishop examined Mr.
Takewell, felt that he was not in a life-threatening condition at
that time and Mr. Takewell was transported via routine transfer
ambulance to the Methodist Hospital of Somerville for admis-
sion and further tests.
Upon arrival at the hospital, Terry Takewel was taken
directly to a patient room, not to the intensive care unit. Due to
his history of being an uncooperative patient during several
previous admissions and due to the fact that he left the hospital
against medical advice during his last admission in July of
1986, acting administrator Tom Staton telephoned Dr. Bishop to
verify the need for admission. Dr. Bishop stated that in his
opinion Mr. Takewell was not in a life-threatening condition at
the time he saw him.
Following the telephone conversation with Dr. Bishop,
Staton went to Mr. Takewell's room and explained to him that
in order to be admitted, he would be required to sign certain
hospital consent forms and provide some standard information.
Mr. Takewell refused. Due to Mr. Takewell's refusal to sign
such standard admission forms and the fact that he was not in a
life-threatening condition requiring immediate hospitalization,
he was not admitted to the hospital. Had his condition been
assessed as a life-threatening emergency at that time by either
Dr. Bishop or the medical personnel at Methodist Hospital of
Somerville, he would have been admitted.
29. Id. at 22, 33.
[Vol. 8:29
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Upon leaving the hospital, Takewell was repeatedly of-
fered transportation to any destination, including Memphis, by
acting administrator Tim Staton. He refused and left on foot?°
Dr. Bishop made certain modifications to the joint media state-
ment before he approved it, and he explicitly affirmed the
accuracy and completeness of the statement at the hearing
before the Board.
The credibility of the witnesses supporting the "conven-
tional" version of the legend of Mr. Takewell is also problem-
atic - which may explain why their stories were not credited
by those who actually heard it delivered. Ms. Hill had a long-
outstanding bill with Methodist Hospital, which routinely
turned such bills over to collection agencies. After Mr.
Takewell's death, she wrote a letter to thQ hospital telling them
they should "forget about my bill or I'm going to split the
hospital right open."' Ms. Hill declined to classify her letter
as an attempt to blackmail the hospital.32 Similarly, although
the Congressional Report and law reviews suggested that multi-
ple witnesses had seen Mr. Takewell carried from his hospital
bed by the administrator, the sole source for that statement was
the testimony of Mr. Takewell's temporary roommate in the
hospital, John Murphy.33 Mr. Murphy's testimony is shot
through with internal contradictions," is flatly inconsistent
with the testimony of a number of other witnesses, 5 and had
30. Id.at8O-81.
31. Id.at 36.
32. See id. at 36. (stating "I don't know whether I'd call it blackmail, but I wrote them a
letter."). "You told them that you were going to lay low, but they had better not push you too far."
"Right." Id. at 37.
33. See EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 16; Weichmann, supra note 2, at 162 ("[a]ccording to
eyewitnesses"); Law, supra note 17, at 779 ("[a]ccording to eyewitnesses"); Frankford, supra note
17, at 90 ("[a]ccording to eyewitnesses"). But see McClurg, supra note 1, at 205 n.173 (stating
that Takewell also told a neighbor when she found him).
34. For example, Mr. Takewell's body was discovered on September 17, 1987. See Tran-
scripts, supra note 23, at Exhibit A. Mr. Murphy testified that he had learned of the death of Mr.
Takewell on September 16, 1987, from a nurse who was not on duty that night. See id. at 122. In
like fashion, Mr. Murphy could not decide whether Mr. Takewell's body was two or three inches
or two or three feet from his bed, so he testified to both. See id. at 110. Mr. Murphy had similar
difficulty deciding whether the EMT who accompanied Mr. Takewell stayed in the room for a few
seconds or several minutes, so he again testified it was both. See id. at 116.
35. For example, Mr. Murphy testified that the ambulance driver who accompanied Mr.
Takewell was Mr. Luther Scruggs, an African-American, but there was testimony that the driver
was Mr. Bubba Johnson, a European-American. See id. at 114-15. Similarly, Mr. Murphy denied
that the nurse had ever left the room to obtain a bag into which Mr. Takewell could breathe. See
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some indications of bias.36
Finally, Methodist Hospital policy was to treat and admit
indigent patients in need of emergency medical attention.37
Dr. Bishop testified that Methodist Hospital had never refused
to admit a patient, regardless of their ability to pay, in the
fifteen years he had practiced there."
The Board held two days of hearings regarding the case,
and made extensive factual findings.39 The Board also deter-
mined that Methodist had done nothing "detrimental" to Mr.
Takewell, and had not violated any significant statutory or
regulatory obligations.' The Board did conclude that the inci-
dent should have been reported, and it imposed a corrective
action plan on Methodist Hospital.41 The Health Care Financ-
ing Administration and the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General also determined that
the treatment received by Mr. Takewell was consistent with
EMTALA.
The legend of Mr. Takewell is moving and exceedingly
persuasive, but it bears at best a passing resemblance to the
truth.42 If anything, the legend of Mr. Takewell belongs in a
id. at 118-19. The nurse testified that he had done so, and his testimony was at some personal risk,
since the State Department of Health included an allegation to that effect in its list of charges
against Methodist Hospital. In like fashion, Mr. Murphy testified that Mr. Takewell had not gone
to the bathroom, although two other witnesses testified that he had. See id. at 119.
36. Mr. Murphy's sister had previously worked at Methodist Hospital as a nurse. See id. at
123. At the time of Mr. Takewell's death, Mr. Murphy erroneously believed his sister had been
laid off by the hospital. See id.
37. See id. at 208,248.
38. Seeid.at70-71.
39. See Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, supra note 23. The findings are consistent with the
joint media statement released by Methodist Hospital and Dr. Bishop. See supra text
accompanying note 30.
40. Methodist Hospital of Somerville, Inc., Before the Tennessee Board for Licensing
Health Care Facilities, Agency Case No. 86-0600, 5th Conclusion of Law (Final Order, 1987)
("By a vote of 6 to 3, the Board finds that the conduct of Methodist Hospital of Somerville was
not detrimental to the welfare of a patient in the institution."). Similarly, the 12th Conclusion of
Law held by a vote of 8 to 4, that the hospital was not guilty "of conduct or practice detrimental to
the welfare of a patient." Id.
41. See id.
42. Lest there be any doubt on this point (as well as on the inaccuracy of the legend of Mr.
Takewell), the statements in the Committee Report which are wrong, unsubstantiated, or
deceptively incomplete have been italicized:
On September 17, 1986, a young man, Mr. Takewell, died at his home in
Somerville, TN, after having been dumped in the parking lot at Methodist Hospital in
Somerville. Mr. Takewell had been a diabetic for years and on the day before he died,
neighbors found him at his home, suffering with acute ketoacidosis. Mrs. Zettie Mae
[Vol. 8:29
1998] PATIENT DUMPING AND EMTALA 41
collection of urban legends, rather than an official report of the
U.S. Congress and a half-dozen law reviews on patient dump-
ing.' What insights can be drawn from this object lesson in
the use and abuse of anecdotal evidence? For starters, even the
most horrific narrative of patient dumping should be ap-
proached with considerable skepticism. Complaints about
dumping invariably feature the claims of the receiving hospital
and patient advocates. Those who are alleged to have engaged
in dumping rarely get an opportunity to tell their side of the
story. The issue of the patient's conduct never even comes up.
In this setting, the evidence that is available may be the truth,
but it is rarely the whole truth. Indeed, some of the most ex-
treme cases of "patient dumping" turn out to be nothing of the
sort if one actually looks at the underlying facts.'
Hill sent Mr. Takewell by ambulance to his doctor, who was familiar with his medical
history. The doctor ordered Mr. Takewell to go immediately to the hospital for
emergency treatment, so Mr. Takewell proceeded by ambulance to the hospital.
According to eyewitnesses, the acting hospital administrator appeared at Mr.
Takewell's bedside, picked him up under the arms, lifted him out of bed, and still
supporting him, walked him out of the hospital to the parking lot where he left him
without shirt or shoes. Mrs. Zettie Mae Hill testified at the subcommittee hearing that
Mr. Takewell told her that he was refused care because he had no insurance and still
owed the hospital for previous treatment. Mrs. Hill confirmed this in a call to the
hospital. Mr. Takewell died at his home the next day.
EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 16, at 11.
43. See EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 16; McClurg, supra note 1, at 205 n.173; Weichmann,
supra note 2, at 161-62; Rothenberg, supra note 12, at 21; Law, supra note 17, at 779; Frankford,
supra note 17, at 90; (representing true believers in the legend of Mr. Takewell in Congress and
the halls of academia).
A wide array of urban legends have circulated in recent years - often on the Internet.
See, e.g., Roy Furchgott, Surfing for Satisfaction: Consumer Complaints Go On Line, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1997, at 8C (noting new urban legends circulating on the web, including Neiman Marcus
and the $250 cookie recipe); Lisa Hoffman, Nonexistent Benefit May Swamp VA. Workers:
Rumors of Life Insurance Dividend May Be Reviving After Lying Relatively Dormant for Years,
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 2 1997, at 39A (describing a thirty-two year-old urban
legend stating certain military veterans are entitled to a special life insurance dividend); Richard
Roeper, Truth of the Matter Is, Urban Legends Die Hard, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, Late
Sports Final Edition, NWS, at 11 (discussing the urban legend gaining momentum on the Internet
regarding settlement of a non-existent class action suit against Gerber); JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND,
THE BABY TRAN AND OTHER LUSTY URBAN LEGENDS (1993).
Articles debunking these urban legends have appeared in a wide range of publications.
See Katherine Ann Samon, The 8 Most Incredible Stories You've Ever Heard, McCALL'S, Sept.
1993, at 120 (explaining common urban legends and how to identify them); Alison Brooks,
Frankenstein Stalks the Urban Jungle, NEw SCINST, Jan. 23,1993, at 47; Richard Wolkomir, If
Those Cobras Don't Get You, the Alligators Will, SMImsONLAN, Nov. 1992, at 167; 'So There's
This Guy, See... ' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Dec. 2, 1991, at 80; Joel Best, The Myth of the
Halloween Sadist, PSYCHOL TODAY, Nov. 1985, at 14 (noting various urban legends).
44. For example, in Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hospital District, 741 F.Supp. 1269
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To be sure, Mr. Takewell is only one case - but it is an
important and revealing case. Representative Weiss did not
lead off the hearing on EMTALA with Mr. Takewell's story by
accident. Many of the anecdotes which "spontaneously" emerge
in the legislative arena are carefully packaged and presented by
advocacy groups as part of a systematic and ongoing effort to
influence public policy.' Advocacy groups expend consider-
able resources in finding and promoting such stories.' Every-
(E.D. Tex. 1990), the District Court concluded that EMTALA had been violated when a physician
at Memorial Hospital sent Ms. Rebecca Owens, an indigent sixteen-year-old woman with labor
pains, to John Sealy Hospital in Galveston, two hundred miles away. The woman left for John
Scaly Hospital, in an eleven-year-old Pinto in bad condition, "in the middle of the night" of
August 3rd. Id. at 1274. Upon arrival at John Sealy Hospital the next morning, she was examined
and told that she would not be admitted because she was not sufficiently dilated. See id.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the District Court, and the woman ultimately
delivered a healthy child at Memorial Hospital on August 7, 1987 - a full three days after she
was discharged by John Scaly Hospital. See id. at 1275. Memorial Hospital sought to defend its
conduct, in part, on the grounds the three-day delay meant that it could not have violated
EMTALA. The District Court rejected this claim and came down hard on the hospital and
physician, but did not even attempt to reconcile its determination that EMTALA had been violated
with John Scaly Hospital's determination that Ms. Owens was not ready to deliver and it was safe
for her to return the two hundred miles to Nacogdoches using the same eleven-year-old Pinto in
bad condition in which she went to Galveston. See id. at 1279. Either both hospitals violated
EMTALA (and John Sealy's conduct was worse, since it sent Ms. Owens on the same perilous
trip twelve hours further into her labor), or neither of them did.
The overlap of EMTALA with medical malpractice also allows diagnostic mistakes to be
condemned as dumping. See Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n., 42 F.3d 851, 861 (4th Cir. 1994)
(affirming lower court's dumping verdict for erroneous diagnosis and treatment of uninsured
septic patient, but cutting damages from $5 million to $1 million under Virginia's malpractice
cap). In a related suit, Power v. Alexandria Physicians Group Ltd., 887 F. Supp 845, 846 (E.D.
Va. 1995), affid, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996), the Judge who had heard the original case expressly
acknowledged that the plaintiff had already "recovered $1 million for her malpractice injuries in
an EMTALA suit."
45. See generally Tamar Lewin, Hybrid Organization Serves as a Conductorfor the Health
Care Orchestra, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1994, at A20. Lewin states:
Using a careful mix of statistics, hard-luck stories and staged political events, Families
USA [Foundation] has played an important behind-the-scenes role in shaping public
perceptions of the nation's health care problems.
[W]hen NBC broadcast a two-hour special on the health care debate ... several of the
people who told their stories came from the Families USA 'misery bank,' a listing of
people who have had problems with health insurance. In the four years since the list
was compiled, it has been used by scores of reporters looking for examples to use in
their reports on health policy.
Id. See also Jill Lawrence, When Studies Don't Sway, Bring on the Victims, L.A. TIMES, July 15,
1990, at A18 (noting that compelling stories "often surface in a newspaper story, a letter to a
lawmaker or a list kept by an advocacy group").
46. Advocacy groups troll for such anecdotes through a variety of mechanisms. See In
Search of Health Care Hardship Stories (visited Oct. 8, 1997) <http://www.familiesusa.
orglfavict.html> ("Families USA Foundation is searching for compelling stories of people who
have had problems with their existing insurance coverage or with loss of coverage entirely.
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one involved knows what they are looking for: "the perfect
victim - someone who is genuine, articulate, and sympathet-
ic.''47 If the "spin" sometimes overtakes the facts, most advo-
cacy groups can doubtless convince themselves that they have
committed no great sin, since they know they are on the side of
the angels. '
Opponents of patient dumping had every incentive to find
and present their best case to Congress - and they came up
with Mr. Takewell. Even if the opponents of patient dumping
had presented a truthful anecdote, it does not follow that such
an anecdote is typical, nor that its frequency is sufficient for
the problem to justify attention.49
Bringing to the public's attention the urgent human cost of Congressional inaction on these issues
is crucial to our ability as advocates to be persuasive and thus effective .... For over 10 years,
Families USA has maintained a database of health care hardship stories, now numbering over a
thousand .... The database is an ongoing project of Families USA, and so we encourage anyone
with a hardship story to tell, even one outside this search, to send your name and a brief
description of your problem so that we can get in touch with you for more details .... Stories will
also be checked for accuracy, to protect the integrity of all involved."); The Quality Watchline
(visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.consumers.org/wline.hm> (announcing Consumer Coalition
for Quality Health Care's toll-free phone number and e-mail address to report complaints about
managed care); The HMO Page (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.hmopage.org> (announcing
"Atrocity of the Month," "Managed Care Hall of Shame," and soliciting additional stories).
47. Lawrence, supra note 45, at A18.
48. See Katherine Dunn, Fibbers: The Lies Journalists Tell, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 21,
1993, at 18. She states:
Of all the lies that are swallowed and regurgitated by the media, the ones that hurt the
most come from the Good Guys, the grass-roots do-gooders, the social work heroes,
the non-profit advocacy groups battling for peace, justice and equality.
[A] lot of reporters don't check facts provided by non-profit organizations because
they assume non-profits don't have anything to gain by lying.
The well-meaning grow desperate for results and stoop to the tactics of their
enemies. It happens all the time.
Id. These creative efforts are not limited to anecdotal evidence, but include statistical
gerrymandering as well. Indeed, the "Good Guys" have made inflated claims about a host of
social ills, including the number of abducted children, suicides during the holiday season, and
domestic violence during and after the Super Bowl. See id. See also Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies,
supra note 23.
49. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. Cmt. L. REV. 737 (1997). Posner
states:
The risk of narratology to which [Catherine] MacKinnon herself succumbs in her
writings on pornography is that of atypicality. MacKinnon is a magnet for the unhappy
stories of prostitutes, rape victims, and pornographic models and actresses. Even if all
these stories are true (though how many are exaggerated? Does MacKinnon know?),
their frequency is an essential issue in deciding what if anything the law should try to
do about the suffering that the stories narrate.
Id. at 744. See also Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL CASE FOR EMTALA
Ms. Dame's Article in this symposium issue of Health
Matrix favorably mentions some of the empirical studies of
patient dumping and economically motivated transfers, and
suggests they provide a solid non-anecdotal basis for
EMTALA.' In an earlier article, I analyzed the published
empirical studies of this area and noted several methodological
difficulties and unexamined assumptions." For the benefit of
the reader, and to sharpen the debate, I have recapitulated my
analysis of the three most significant articles mentioned by Ms.
Dame.
A. Highland General Study 2
This pilot study, published in 1984, presented data from
patients transferred from private hospitals to the emergency
room of a public hospital in Alameda, California during the
first six months of 1981." A total of 458 patients were
transferred, 272 of whom (60%) were admitted to the hospital,
and 22 of whom (5%) required intensive care.54 The reason
for transfer was not usually recorded.55 After in-depth review
of the charts of patients thought to be at high risk, the authors
concluded that 33 patients (7%) were "inappropriately" trans-
ferred and received "substandard" care - and some of the
transfers appeared to be economically motivated.'
Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1914 (1996):
Courts created wrongful discharge law on a foundation of anecdotes drawn from the
peculiar sample of cases that reach state courts. In general, anecdotes are a poor basis
for public policy .... The grim picture of the workplace those anecdotes paint is
contradicted by the evidence that does exist about the extent of the problems
employees face in the workplace.
50. Lauren Dame, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: The
Anolmalous Right to Health Care, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 3 (1998).
51. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, supra note 23.
52. David U. Himmeltein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social Triage, 74
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494 (1984) (analyzing transfers to public hospital in California). Highland
General Hospital is the major public acute care facility in Alameda County. See id. at 494-95.
53. See id. Although the article appeared as a "public health brief" in the American Journal
of Public Health, it clearly proceeded from a particular political slant: the first institutional affilia-
tion of the authors is the "Research Group of the Committee to Defend the People's Health." See
id.
54. See Himmelstein, supra note 52, at 495.
55. See id. at 496.
56. The authors identified 111 charts as high-risk patients requiring in-depth review. Charts
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This study is limited by a variety of factors, only some of
which were noted by the authors. The study was retrospective;
it determined stability based on the application of subjective
criteria to data drawn from medical records prepared for a
different purpose;57 it did not include an assessment of the
numbers of patients treated by private hospitals (and the cost of
such treatment) when the patients were uninsured but were not
transferred; it did not include an assessment of the costs im-
posed on Highland General by the transfers; it failed to assess
the results in light of the observation that private hospitals
which transferred patients to Highland General also "often
admit critically ill patients and do not have policies of routine-
ly transferring such patients;" ' it did not evaluate whether the
transferring hospital was able to provide the required care;59
and it did not evaluate whether there were any adverse conse-
quences of transfer.'
for 103 patients ultimately were available. All four clinician authors had to agree that the patient
was "at risk of life-threatening complications in transit or that accepted practice would require
immediate therapy that was delayed by transit" in order for the incident to be classified as one
involving substandard care. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). Of the 103 charts which were reviewed
in detail, 11 indicated that the patient was transferred because of inability to pay. See id.
57. See id. at 496 (noting that the medical records which were reviewed included those of
the receiving hospital, which may have biased the determination that the patient was unstable at
the time of transfer).
58. Id.
59. The authors do note the possibility that transferring physicians may have believed that
"better care was available at the public hospital" because it has a residency training program. Id. at
496. However, the authors discount this as an explanation because (i) local hospitals opposed the
designation of Highland General as a mandatory trauma referral center, (ii) few patients with
private insurance were transferred; (iii) "32 of 33 jeopardized patients came from hospitals with
full emergency capabilities, including inpatient critical care facilities and specialty surgical
backup available within 30 minutes;" and some specialty services were available at private
hospitals but not at Highland General. Id.
The ability of the private hospital to provide the care should not be dismissed so lightly.
Indeed, the authors provide an illustration of the problems in this area in what they label a
"particularly disturbing case" - a private hospital was forced to transfer an uninsured comatose
victim of a beating to Highland General after two neurosurgeons refused to see the patient. See id.
at 495. Even post-EMTALA, physicians who are not on-call to the emergency department retain
the right to choose their patients.
60. Although the authors repeatedly use inflammatory language to describe the care which
was received by the transferred patients (the transfers were "dangerous," and "imperiled," or
"jeopardized" the patient), the study expressly disavowed making any determination on whether
any harm had resulted from inappropriate transfer. Given the views of the authors on the subject
they were studying - one does not create a "Committee to Defend the People's Health" (see
Himmelstein, supra note 52) unless one believes that economically motivated transfers and
dumping are hazardous - it is hard to avoid the conclusion the authors would have been happy to
include such data had they been able to identify anyone who had been injured as a result of
transfer.
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B. Cook County Study6'
This study, published in 1986, presented data from the 500
patients who were admitted to the medical and surgical servic-
es after they were transferred to the Cook County Hospital ED
from another ED during a forty-one day period in 1983.62
Cook County employed a telephone protocol for accepting such
transfers.63 Based on the responses to the telephone protocol,
the authors concluded that eighty-seven percent of the transfers
were made because the patients lacked insurance."
The authors determined that 106 patients (24%) were
transferred in an unstable condition, although not all unstable
patients required treatment in an intensive care unit.65 In some
of these patients, treatment had been initiated, but "definitive
treatment was usually not begun." Fatalities were much
higher among those who were transferred in an unstable condi-
tion (7.5%) than in a stable condition (1.5%). Transfer was
associated with an average delay in definitive treatment of
approximately five hours, with delays ranging from one to
61. Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective Study of 467
Patients, 314 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986) (studying medical and surgical patients who were
transferred from EDs and admitted to Cook County Hospital). Cook County Hospital was
Chicago's only public general hospital. See id. at 552.
62. During the study period, 602 medical and surgical patients were transferred to the Cook
County ED, and 500 were admitted. Out of the 500 admissions, the authors identified a study
population of 484 (patients were excluded if they had been transferred from an inpatient setting
rather than an ED, or if they were not transfers to the medical and surgical services). See id. at
553. The authors were able to locate charts for 467 of the 484 patients. See id.
63. Seeid. at 552. The transfer protocol required the resident at Cook County to fill out a
form with the name of the patient and transferring hospital, vital signs, a brief clinical summary,
and the reason for the requested transfer. Ninety-three percent of requests for transfer were
accepted. Transfer was refused when the resident concluded that hospitalization was not required,
the patient was not sufficiently stable to be transferred, or there was noncompliance with Cook
County's transfer protocol. See id.
64. See id. at 553. Responses were only available for 243 of the study patients (52%), but
the authors believed that "this subgroup was representative of the entire study sample." Id. at 555.
65. Stability was determined "based on review of the clinical information available in the
records of the transferring hospital," and the application of an extensive list of clinical criteria. Id.
at 553. Only 435 charts (of the 467 patient population) contained sufficient records from the
transferring hospital to perform this analysis. See id. at 554. Although 106 patients were admitted
to the intensive care unit (ICU), only 41 were classified as unstable. However, compared to the
transfer population as a whole, a much higher percentage of unstable patients were admitted to the
ICU (39% v. 14.6%). See id.
66. Id. at 554. Definitive treatment includes "emergency surgical procedures (e.g.,
exploratory surgery, repair of vessels or vital organs or both, and craniotomies), antibiotic therapy,
and emergency invasive diagnostic tests." Id.
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eighteen hours. Few of the patients had consented to the trans-
fer, and those that had been told of the transfer were not usual-
ly advised of the reasons.67
Like the Highland General study, the Cook County Hospi-
tal study has certain limitations. Although the study was pro-
spective, the analysis focused on patients who were admitted to
Cook County.' As such, the study reported an artificially
high rate of unstable transfers, compared to that which would
have been determined with a more inclusive denominator.69
As with the Highland General Study, the authors did not in-
clude an assessment of the numbers of patients treated by
private hospitals (and the cost of such treatment) when the pa-
tients were uninsured but were not transferred, did not assess
the extent to which the transferring hospital was able to pro-
vide treatment, and the analysis of the adverse consequences of
transfer (which focused solely on mortality statistics) does not
address certain significant issues.7'
67. A signed informed consent for transfer was present in 25 (6%) of the charts. Thirteen
percent of patients reported they had not be told of their impending transfer. Of those who were
informed, 36% indicated they were not told why they were being transferred. See id.
68. As noted previously, 602 medical and surgical patients were transferred to the Cook
County ED, but only 500 were admitted. See id. at 553. In addition, Cook County Hospital
routinely refuses to accept transfers if the patient does not require hospitalization. See id. at 552.
69. The denominator for determining the 24% rate of non-stable transfers was the number
of located charts for patients admitted to the medical and surgical services of Cook County
Hospital in which there was sufficient information to make a determination of stability. See id. at
554. If one uses the total number of patients transferred to Cook County Hospital (620), the rate of
non-stable transfers could be as low as 17.6%. One should also consider the extent to which Cook
County Hospital's general refusal to accept transfers of patients who did not require
hospitalization has an impact on the pool of transfers - and might well result in an artificial
overstatement of the incidence of non-stable transfers.
70. The study did not control for severity of illness and case mix in assessing the disparity
in mortality rates between stable and unstable transfers. Similarly, the fatality rates were
significantly higher among unstable patients transferred to the medical service (10.9%) compared
to the surgical service (3.9%) - a result the authors did not attempt to explain. See id. at 555.
This result is particularly interesting, since surgical service patients were significantly more likely
to require the use of the ICU (60.8% v. 18.2% unstable; 16.5% v. 6.5% stable) than medical
service patients. See id.
The authors suggest that lower mortality rates for surgical patients may be attributable to
the preponderance of trauma in that population, since the most severely injured patients may have
died before transfer - a plausible interpretation, but one that is unsupported by any data. The
authors do observe that the higher mortality rates among transferred patients on the medical
service may be due to differences in case mix or some aspect of the transfer process - but as with
the surgical service, there is no basis in the data to assess the matter. See id. See also J. Douglas
White, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 315 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1421 (1986) (arguing that it is
inappropriate to compare transferred and non-transferred patient populations); Jerrold B. Leiken
& Kenneth S. Polin, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 315 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1421 (1986) (same).
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Finally, members of the Department of Surgery and the
Section of Trauma at Cook County Hospital disagreed with the
conclusions of the Cook County study." Since surgical pa-
tients accounted for a majority of those transferred to Cook
County, their views should be accorded considerable weight.
These commentators argued that the capabilities of the transfer-
ring hospital needed to be taken into account, and that transfer
in an unstable condition was not necessarily indicative of inap-
propriate care, since "many patients with trauma or other emer-
gency surgical conditions can never be stabilized in the prima-
ry hospital, and they therefore must be transferred to Cook
County Hospital in an unstable condition."72 In addition, these
authors correctly noted that transfer of stable patients requiring
medical care was consistent with the "stated mission of Cook
County Hospital... to render treatment to the medically indi-
gent in our community."'73
C. Cook County IX7
In 1987, the first two authors of the Cook County Study
published a "Special Communication" on dumping.' The arti-
cle contained no empirical data but included the author's esti-
mate that 250,000 patients a year are dumped - a figure that
has attained the status of gospel through repetition in law re-
views, Congressional hearings, newspaper articles, and medical
literature.
76
71. John Barrett & Olga Jonasson, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1421 (1986).
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications, and Policy
Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500 (1987).
75. See Schiff, supra note 61.
76. See Ansel & Schiff, supra note 74, at 1500. For examples of the use of this figure, see
U.S. Termed Lax on 'Dumping' Patients, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1991, at A20 (stating that "[i]n
1987, a study published in The Journal of the American Medical Association estimated that
250,000 patients nationwide were "dumped" each year from hospital emergency rooms because
they could not pay for their care or were on Medicaid"); Rochelle E. Moore, Transfer Center Can
Control, Manage Admissions, HEALTHCARE FN. MGMT., Sept. 1990, at 40 ("Despite the law,
hospitals wrongly transfer an estimated 250,000 patients each year."). Hospital's Handling of
Uninsured Patients Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1988, at A25 (noting publication of a House
Committee on Government Operations Report, which "said that more than 250,000 patients are
dumped yearly"). Howard S. Berliner, Patient Dumping: No One Wins and We All Lose, 78 AM. J.
PuB. HEALTH 1279, 1279 (1988) (repeating estimate elicited at Congressional hearing).
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The claim that 250,000 patients a year are dumped is
impressive, but is based on generalizing from a skewed sample
while simultaneously using an overbroad definition. The au-
thors arrived at this figure by extrapolating from studies con-
ducted in Dallas, Oakland, and Chicago to "estimate" a total
for nationwide patient dumping.77 Each of these areas encom-
passes large urban populations with substantial numbers of
indigent and uninsured individuals. Even taken in the aggre-
gate, the sample is by no means representative of the country
as a whole. Accordingly, a straightforward extrapolation based
on population - which is what the authors did - is inappro-
priate.
The definition of "dumping" employed by the authors -
"the denial of or limitation in the provision of medical services
to a patient for economic reasons and the referral of that pa-
tient elsewhere" - is also overbroad. 8 This definition encom-
passes emergency, urgent, and non-urgent services for both
stable and unstable patients. In essence, this definition would
require all hospitals to provide all necessary services to all
comers, regardless of whether the patient is stable or not, and
regardless of the patient's ability to pay (or to obtain cheaper
services elsewhere, as in a managed care arrangement).
EMTALA, for all its breadth, is facially limited to restrictions
on the transfer of unstable patients.
D. Summary of Empirical Studies
Flawed as they are, these studies still make clear that the
transfer of "unstable" patients is exceedingly uncommon. Two
hundred and fifty thousand patient dumping episodes a year
certainly sounds like a lot, but it is only 0.25% of the 100 mil-
lion visits to EDs in 1995."9 Correcting for the distortions in
the studies (i.e., overbroad definition of dumping, skewed
77. See Ansell & Schiff, supra note 74, at 1502.
78. Id. at 1500. It is unclear whether the authors, in fact, are limiting themselves to this
broad definition, since they note that a patient may be dumped for exhibiting "undesirable"
conditions, such as intoxication or overdose conditions. See id. Obviously, such patients may still
be insured.
79. See AMERCAN HOsPrrAL ASSOCIATION, HoSPrrAL STATISTICS: EMERGING TRENDS IN
HosPrrALS (1996-97) (data regarding total outpatient visits to emergency rooms compiled from
the 1995 Annual Survey of Hospitals).
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sample) can easily shrink the estimated frequency one-hundred-
fold or more.
In these and other studies, the extent to which harm result-
ed from such transfers also turns out to be a hard thing to as-
sess; although most transfers resulted in a delay in definitive
treatment and increased costs for repeated tests, some patients
received better care as a result of being transferred. The studies
which examined the financial implications of such transfers
invariably demonstrated significant financial impact on the
hospitals which received such transfers, but the impact would
be equally significant on the transferring hospitals, were they
not allowed to transfer such patients. None of the studies at-
tempted to measure the relative significance of charity care
provided by private hospitals for patients they did not transfer.
Thus, the empirical studies - including those cited by Ms.
Dame - provide at best an uncontrolled snapshot of the nu-
merator, but little insight into the denominator - and simply
fail to support the claim that patient dumping is a generalized
problem.
In the absence of useful empirical data, Congress acted on
the basis of isolated and unrepresentative anecdotes. These
anecdotes may have been sufficient to persuade Congress, but
such an approach is asking for trouble - even without the
difficulties highlighted by the legend of Mr. Takewell. Despite
the tendency of Congress to believe otherwise, "[t]he plural of
anecdote is not data."80
V. THE FUTURE OF EMTALA
When EMTALA was enacted, the hospital was the center
of the health care universe. Indemnity insurance dominated the
health insurance market. Medicare had implemented the pro-
spective payment system, but cost-containment had not really
had a major impact on hospitals. In the intervening eleven
years, the hospital has been largely supplanted by outpatient
treatment, and managed care has become the dominant form of
health care insurance and delivery. Capitation and heavily
80. Edith Greene, A Love Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. Sys. J. 99, 100 (1995) (emphasis
original).
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discounted fee-for-service arrangements have become standard.
Lengths of stay and rates of hospitalization have dropped pre-
cipitously. Hospitals have closed, merged, and downsized.
Hospital finances have become increasingly tenuous, especially
for "safety-net" hospitals."
These pressures have had a disproportionate impact on
care provided in the ED. Emergency Departments
disproportionately serve patients covered by Medicaid and the
uninsured. They often lose money, or make money on only a
small percentage of well-insured individuals. These economic
pressures have made it increasingly difficult for many hospitals
to sustain ED services. In addition, managed care intentionally
targeted care provided in the ED. Emergency Department
charges are expensive. Those who present to the ED often do
not require care in that setting, whether one judges prospective-
ly or retrospectively. The philosophy of managed care is also
based on continuity of care - an ideal which is routinely
sacrificed when the ED is the locus of care. Finally, presenta-
tion at the ED can trigger a "clinical cascade," where the "bet-
ter safe than sorry/cost is no object" default rule can result in
substantial expenses when more cost-effective options are
available.
Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) sought to limit ED
utilization by using such mechanisms as mandatory
preauthorization, restrictive coverage, selective contracting,
high copayments and deductibles, and aggressive coverage
denials.82 The results were pronounced; as managed care tar-
geted ED utilization, patient visits to the ED declined in 1994
for the first time in twenty-two years, and again in 1995, de-
81. See Raymond J. Baxter & Robert E. Mechanic, The Status of Local Health Care Safety
Nets, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7 (1997) (cataloguing deteriorating financial stability of safety-net
institutions).
82. See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection (?), Managed Care, and the Emergency
Department, in AcHIEVNG QUALrrY IN MANAGED CAPEE THE ROLE OF LAW 57 (John D. Blum
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Consumer Protection] (analyzing how consumer protection laws interact
with the cost-cutting efforts of MCOs); Diane E. Hoffman, Emergency Care and Managed Care -
A Dangerous Combination, 72 WASH. L. REV. 315 (1997) (criticizing MCOs for being unduly
restrictive regarding coverage of emergency medical treatment); Harry Davidson Kerr, Access to
Emergency Departments: A Survey of HMO Policies, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 274 (1989)
(describing how HMOs control the costs of ED visits). Cf Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s Refising
Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert, N.Y.TIMEs, July 9, 1995, at A1 (discussing how HMOs are
allegedly shifting ED costs to hospitals, physicians, and patients through coverage decisions).
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spite steady increases in the number of the uninsured. Nation-
wide, average ED utilization is approximately 360 visits/1000
people per year (with significant regional variation), but tightly
controlled MCOs have decreased these figures significantly.
The growth of managed care created problems for hospi-
tals in two directions - from the insured patients who no
longer showed up, and (paradoxically enough) from the insured
patients who did show up. The former problem was caused by
the simple fact that EDs (and to a lesser extent hospitals) made
most of their money from a small percentage of their custom-
ers - those with "good" insurance." The "disappearance" of
these patients placed a severe crimp in the revenue stream of
many EDs.
The other difficulty arose from the opposite direction.
MCOs had market power and used it to extract substantial
discounts. Thus, even if a visit to the ED was "authorized," the
hospital received less revenue per paid ED encounter, further
constraining the revenue stream. The final blow came from
insured patients whose care was not "authorized." As noted
previously, MCOs used a variety of tools to restrict access to
emergency care - and refused to pay for care that was not
provided in accordance with its requirements. EMTALA may
have obligated the hospital to screen and treat, but MCOs were
under no compulsion to pay for such efforts. Worse still,
EMTALA explicitly treated any attempt to secure pre-authori-
zation as a violation, while MCOs were free to deny coverage
if contractually required pre-authorization was not sought.
Thus, EMTALA effectively left hospitals at the mercy of free-
riding MCOs - and left both at the mercy of free-riding pa-
tients.
Hospitals now face the worst of all possible worlds in the
ED: a declining relative and absolute volume of insured pa-
tients; those who are insured pay less; and those who are in-
sured sometimes do not pay at all. The bad news is not limited
83. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 17, at 458:
Patient classes made highly unequal contributions to the profit picture. The hospital
profited substantially by treating a few payor groups and lost nearly as much treating
all other payor groups. Six payor categories generated positive revenues... [but two
payor classes, totalling 33% of visits and 26% of expenses] contributed 90 percent of
profits.
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to the ED - the rest of the hospital faces similar difficulties.
Given these changes in the health care marketplace, the
future prospects for EMTALA are exceedingly poor. Uncom-
pensated care is financed by a complex web of cross-subsidies
under the best of circumstances. The first rule of any system of
cross-subsidies is that one needs a steady volume of cross-
subsidizers, even if the rate of cross-subsidizees is flat. The
growth of managed care and the increase in the number of
uninsured has destabilized both sides of the equation. Even
with the best of intentions, both ends of a see-saw can not be
up at the same time.84
EMTALA may make a federal case out of any failure to
provide necessary care, but there are no free lunches - even
in the ED. The predictable long-term consequence of
EMTALA is a system-wide loss in ED capacity as hospitals
close, downsize, or relocate, and physicians modify the nature
of their relationships with EDs and hospitals. To be sure, there
was excess capacity to begin with, and EMTALA is only one
of a number of causes of the constriction in supply. However,
the perversity of EMTALA is that, to a considerable extent, its
costs are imposed on the hospitals and physicians who were
already doing their part for those EMTALA was intended to
help. Except in the (exceedingly) short-run, EMTALA can not
increase ED capacity - and it has a distinct tendency to de-
stroy it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The "'dumping dilemma' easily lends itself to anecdotal
horror stories." 5 However, "horror stories" are not necessarily
reliable. Mr. Takewell's case presents a particularly unflattering
84. In response to these difficulties, the American College of Emergency Physicians has
sought legislation to force MCOs to pay for EMTALA-mandated screening and treatment. See
Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 82; Hoffmann, supra note 82, at 368-93. Their efforts
have met with some success, although most of the pending and enacted legislation has instead
focused on whether a "prudent layperson" would have gone to the ED. Although this "solution"
has some surface plausibility, at best it is an inadequate response to a problem created, to a first
approximation, by EMTALA.
85. William Gary Reed et al., The Effect of a Public Hospital's Transfer Policy on Patient
Care, 315 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1428, 1429 (1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting E. Friedman, The
Dumping Dilemma: The Poor are Always With Some of Us, HOSP., Sept. 1, 1982, at 51).
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example of "anecdotal advocacy," and leaves little doubt why
such evidence is shunned or "heavily discounted" in most
fields.8 6
To be sure, disproving an anecdote might seem no great
accomplishment. Yet, if evidence of this caliber persuaded
Congress to enact EMTALA, it is certainly fair to ask whether
a fuller record should cause Congress to reconsider. Those who
live by the anecdotal sword should be prepared to die by it.
More importantly, reliance on anecdotes is intellectually slop-
py. It is the mine run of cases we should care about - not the
occasional anecdotal bad outcome. 7 It should take more than
a few bad anecdotes to persuade Congress to take over an
entire market - unless it is prepared to do so across the board,
beginning with the legal profession."8 Of course, one could
just ignore these considerations and legislate - but in that
direction lies EMTALA and other ineptly drafted, tunnel-vi-
sioned, short-sighted, and counterproductive laws. When it
comes to EMTALA, the past is decidedly imperfect.
And what of the future? Although the United States is a
land of optimists, EMTALA's prospects are decidedly grim."
86. See Saks, supra note 14, at 1159. Of course, statistical evidence can be problematic as
well - especially when it is "discovered" or promoted by those with an axe to grind. Cf. Dunn,
supra note 48, and Hyman, supra note 23.
87. EMTALA's enthusiasts understand this point perfectly well - and exploit it to
considerable effect in opposing "reforms" they do not like. Compare Statement of Joan
Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, Hearing on Product Liability Reform, House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, April 10, 1997 (visited Oct. 9, 1997)
<http:lwww.citizen.orglcongresslcivjus/jctest.html> (opposing product liability reform on the
ground that case in favor of such reform is based on "junk statistics . . . myths, and
unrepresentative anecdotes") with LAUREN DAME & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S
HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, UPDATE ON PATIENT DUMPING IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOMS
(Mar. 1996); JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CIzEN's HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
UPDATE ON PATIENT DUMPING VIOLATIONS (OcL 1994).
88. See Hyman, Kindness of Strangers, supra note 3 (applying EMTALA's model to other
markets, including law); Tony Snow, Clintoncare is Dead, But Don't TeIlNBC, DENV. POST, June
24, 1994, at B7 (noting that town meeting on health care reform featured "tales of woe ....
Michael Thompson, who runs a small marketing company in Springfield, Va., complained about
the technique of using tear-jerker anecdotes as a way to introduce stories. 'If we're going to set
policy by horror stories,' he said, 'we ought to nationalize lawyers, since everybody has a horror
story about lawyers."').
89. Certainly, one could not end up with a health care "system" like ours without being
optimistic about human nature and the likely level of charity care. Those who need a more
classical reference should consult ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 453
(George Lawrence trans., 1969) (noting American belief in "an ideal but always fugitive
perfection"). For those who prefer literature, see F. SCOTT FrZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 182
(1925):
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Changes in the medical marketplace have virtually eliminated
the cross-subsidies with which hospitals have historically fi-
nanced uncompensated care. In addition, most managed care
plans have imposed wide-ranging restrictions on access to the
ED. If the touchstone for EMTALA was that everyone should
have access to the ED because the insured do, these restrictions
undercut the moral case for EMTALA. 9 Indeed, EMTALA
effectively pegs the level of emergency care above the amount
people are willing to pay for - and imposes it to a first ap-
proximation on the hospitals which are least capable of spread-
ing the cost. This "solution" is a recipe for disaster. Only two
things have kept the system from a complete meltdown: the
increasingly strained efforts of the Courts to maintain a distinc-
tion between EMTALA and state malpractice law,9 and
HCFA's sub silentio acknowledgement that EMTALA is a
symbolic law.'
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before
us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter-tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our
arms farther .... And one fine morning -
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
90. See Hymnan, Consumer Protection, supra note 82. But see Hoffmann, supra note 82, at
349-51 (arguing that various market imperfections and externalities prevent Americans from
purchasing the level of emergency care coverage they want and/or need).
91. See Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc
reversal of panel decision breaching wall between EMTALA and state malpractice claims). See
also Power v. Alexandria Physicians Group Ltd., 887 F. Supp. 845, 852-53 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(patient successfully used an EMTALA suit to recover for medical malpractice), aff d, 91 F.3d
132 (4th Cir. 1996).
92. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233
(1990). He states:
Most regulatory statutes instruct agencies to balance competing concerns in setting
standards. Some regulatory statutes, however, impose short deadlines and stringent
standard-setting criteria that are designed to address a single, overriding concern to the
exclusion of other factors ....
The programs mandated by such legislation are more symbolic than functional.
Frequently, the legislature has failed to address the administrative and political
constraints that will block implementation of the statute. By enacting this type of
statute, legislators reap the political benefit of voting ... against 'trading lives for
dollars,' and successfully sidestep the difficult policy choices ....
Believing that it would be irresponsible and politically mad to interpret and implement
symbolic statutory provisions literally, the agency's usual response is to resist
implementation.
Id. at 233-34. Professor Mark Hall characterized EMTALA as a symbolic act in Hall, supra note
2, at 397. For more on EMTALA as symbolic law, see Hyman, Bad Laws, supra note 3.
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Symbolic laws are hard to change - let alone repeal.9 a
However, even symbolic laws are subject to the laws of eco-
nomics. EMTALA will be repealed - although whether the
repeal will be de jure or de facto remains to be seen. It is
appropriate that we celebrate EMTALA's tenth (actually elev-
enth) anniversary, since there will not be many more such
occasions.
93. See Dwyer, supra note 92, at 287 ("Once Congress has taken the position that public
health must be protected at any cost, it is difficult for the legislature to adopt a more moderate
position. Position-taking by other legislators and charges of trading lives for dollars will deter
many legislators from supporting such amendments.").
The firefight between the Administration and the 104th Congress over amending the
nation's environmental laws to explicitly incorporate consideration of costs and benefits
demonstrates the likely difficulties. See John H. Cushman, Jr. &Timothy Egan, Battles on
Conservation are Reaping Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at Al:
When Republicans won control in 1994, they aggressively pressed forward with an
antiregulatory agenda that environmentalists saw as threatening to dismantle a whole
generation of rules that not only preserved open spaces and wilderness areas, but also
put protection of the public's health and safety above other considerations, including
economic ones.
An intense battle over how to reshape environmental regulations ensued, with the
Administration presenting its own, moderate ideas but essentially playing a defensive
game and labeling the Republicans as tools of industrial special interests. The fight
made every issue, including cleaning up toxic wastes or chopping down ancient for-
ests, a matter of pitched partisan politics.
However, the same Congress successfully enacted the Food Quality Protection Act, H.R.
1627, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), which repealed the Delaney Clause. See Richard Lugar, The
Food Quality Protection Act Balances Food Safety with Agricultural Productivity and Updates
the Delaney Clause, ROLL CALL, June 10, 1996 (reforming the Delaney Clause from "zero
tolerance" to more reasonable standard through the Food Quality Protection Act); Rick Weiss,
Clinton Signs New Standards on Food Safety; President Also Ratifies Gambling Commission,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at A21 (describing the Food Quality Protection Act as replacing the
Delaney Clause with the "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard); Margaret Kriz, A Peace
Treaty Over the Delaney Clause, 28 NAT'L J. 31, 1642 (1996) (discussing the eventual
capitulation of both political parties to changing the Delaney Clause); Gary Lee, In Food Safety
Changes, Victories for Many, WASH. PosT, July 28, 1996, at A4 (replacing the Delaney Clause
with the "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard pleases many groups). The Delaney Clause,
which prohibited pesticides posing a non-zero risk of cancer, was every bit as symbolic as
EMTALA.
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